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I.  INTRODUCTION 
As China grows in power in the global economy,1 the need to address 
endemic corruption within the government has become increasingly important.  
Chinese officials regard corruption as one of the greatest threats to China’s 
growing economy and the political stability of the Communist Party 
of China (CPC).2  The indirect costs of corruption, including efficiency 
losses of goods and services, and damage to the environment and public 
health, are incalculable.3  In 2013, China ranked 80th out of 177 countries 
and territories in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions 
Index and scored 40 points on a scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very 
clean).4  Transparency International’s Bribe Payer’s Index for 2011 ranks 
China 27th out of 28 among the world’s leading economies.5 
The nature and development of corruption in China is deeply rooted in 
its culture and relates back to the Confucian concept of social hierarchy,6 
as well as in the social and cultural practices based on guanxi.7  Directly 
translated to mean “relationship,” guanxi describes special relationships 
that often extend beyond personal connections and can be more influential 
than laws and rules.8  Guanxi relationships can develop through mutual 
interests or common goals, and cultivate through activities such as gift-
giving.9  The emphasis on relationships, especially in the business context, 
can ultimately lead to bribery and corruption as businesses and government 
officials seek to exploit their networks to gain private advantages.10  
Similarly, Confucianism defines individuals by their families and 
interconnections within a social network.11 Businesses in traditional Chinese 
 
 1.  See WAYNE M. MORRISSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33534, China’s Economic 
RISE: HISTORY, TRENDS, CHALLENGES, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 1, 37–
38 (2015), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33534.pdf. 
 2.  Id. at 37. 
 3.  Minxin Pei, Corruption Threatens China’s Future, Policy Brief No. 55, CARNEGIE 
ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE, 5 (Oct. 2007), http://carnegieendowment.org/files/pb55_ 
pei_china_corruption_final.pdf. 
 4.  Corruption Perceptions Index 2013 , TRANSPARENCY INT’L, http://www. 
transparency.org/cpi2013/results (last visited Oct. 2, 2014) (stating that almost 70% of countries 
scored below 50 out of 100). 
 5.  Deborah Hardoon & Finn Heinrich, Bribe Payers Index 2011, TRANSPARENCY 
INT’L 5 (2011), https://www.transparency.org/bpi2011/results. 
 6.  See generally Patricia Pattison & Daniel Herron, The Mountains Are High and 
the Emperor Is Far Away: Sanctity of Contract in China, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 459, 478–79 
(2003). 
 7.  See Micaela Tucker, “Guanxi!”-“Gesundheit!” an Alternative View on the “Rule 
of Law” Panacea in China, 35 VT. L. REV. 689, 693 (2011). 
 8.  Id. at 694–95. 
 9.  Id. at 696–97. 
 10.  See id. at 698–700. 
 11.  Pattinson, supra note 6, at 483. 
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culture, consequently, did not operate independently of family and social 
relationships.12  Since these types of relationships often took precedent over 
contractual ones, preserving and maintaining connections within a community 
was important in order to gain benefits and privileges.13 
Since taking office in 2013, President Xi Jinping has emphasized the 
importance of enforcing his campaign against corruption.14  The number 
of bribery convictions issued in recent years and the possibility of receiving 
the death penalty for serious corruption-related crimes underscores the 
seriousness with which the CPC considers corruption.15  The penalties for 
bribery are harsh compared to most other countries and serve as a strong 
method of deterrence. 
Part II of this Article discusses the PRC’s anti-corruption laws in the 
individual and commercial contexts and note the inherent problems in the 
CPC’s enforcement efforts.  Part III will discuss the impact of these provisions 
on China’s economy, on China’s rule of law, and on foreign businesses.  
Part IV will provide recommendations on how China can enhance its anti-
corruption enforcement efforts and improve transparency of its laws, taking 
cues from the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and the U.K. 
Bribery Act.  Part V will conclude by explaining why China should join the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Anti-
Bribery Convention to guarantee implementation of its laws. 
II. ANTI-CORRUPTION LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Two separate sets of laws, PRC Criminal Law (“Criminal Law”)16 and 
the Anti-Unfair Competition Law of the People’s Republic of China 
(AUCL),17 create the framework for China’s anti-corruption laws.  The 
 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. at 486. 
 14.  See infra Part II.A. 
 15.  See Ji Zhebu, Crime and Punishment for Corrupt Officials, CHINA DAILY (Aug. 
29, 2013, 7:26 AM), http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2013-08/29/content_16929435.htm. 
 16.   Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingfa (中华人民共和国刑法) [hereinafter Criminal 
Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., on July 
1, 1997, effective Mar. 14, 1997), arts. 163–64, 385–93, P.R.C. LAWS, http://www.cecc.gov/ 
resources/legal-provisions/criminal-law-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china. 
 17.  Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Fan Bu Zheng Dang Jing Zheng Fa 
(中华人民共和国反不正当竞争法) [Law Against Unfair Competition of the People’s Republic 
of China] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 2, 1993, effective Sept. 2, 
1993), art. 8, P.R.C. LAWS, http://www.cecc.gov/resources/legal-provisions/prc-unfair-
competition-law-english-and-chinese-text. 
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AUCL addresses commercial bribery, while the Criminal Law addresses 
both official bribery and commercial bribery.18  Additionally, to comply 
with the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) 
requirements,19 the PRC amended the Criminal Law to prohibit bribery of 
foreign officials.20 
These anti-corruption provisions prohibit state functionaries,21 state-
owned entities, non-state entities, and employees from taking advantage of 
their positions to demand bribes or illegally accept bribes to secure benefits 
for the briber.22  They also prohibit individuals from receiving illegitimate 
benefits by giving bribes to state functionaries, state-owned entities, non-
state entities, and employees, or from receiving improper commercial 
benefits through bribing foreign functionaries or officials of international 
public organizations.23  Furthermore, individuals may not give and accept 
rebates or service charges while conducting economic activities.24  Another 
set of disciplinary rules issued by the CPC Central Committee in 2010 
provide guidelines for CPC leaders and cadres to follow.25  Prohibited activities 
include accepting cash or financial instruments as gifts, engaging in profit-
making activities, and taking advantages of their positions to receive 
illegitimate gains.26 
Criminal penalties for parties accepting bribes (the “demand side”) are 
generally harsher than those for parties giving bribes, and fall within the 
 
 18.  See Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 16, arts. 163–64. 
 19.  See G.A. Res. 58/4, United Nations Convention against Corruption, art. 16 (Oct. 
31, 2003) [hereinafter UNCAC]. 
 20.  See Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 16, art. 164. 
 21.  Id. art. 93 (“Persons who perform public service in State-owned companies or, 
enterprises, institutions or people’s organizations, persons who are assigned by State 
organs, State-owned companies, enterprises or institutions to companies, enterprises or 
institutions that are not owned by the State or people’s organizations to perform public 
service and the other persons who perform public service according to law shall all be 
regarded as State functionaries.”). 
 22.  See Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 16, arts. 163, 
385–88; Law Against Unfair Competition of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 
17, art. 8. 
 23.  Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 16, arts. 163–64, 
389–93; Law Against Unfair Competition of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 
17, art. 8. 
 24.  Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 16, arts. 163, 387, 
389, 391, 393; Law Against Unfair Competition of the People’s Republic of China, supra 
note 17, art. 8. 
 25.  Chinese Communist Party Issues Code of Ethics to Ensure Clean Governance, 
XINHUA NEWS AGENCY (Feb. 23, 2010), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010- 
02/23/c_13184967.htm (stating that the Central Committee updated the Code of Ethics for CPC 
Leaders and Cadres on Clean Government on February 2010). 
 26.  Id. 
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Criminal Law.27  Notably, foreign official bribery cases seem to punish 
only the party that provides the bribe (the “supply side”).28  For individuals 
accepting bribes, these sanctions include fines, criminal detention, fixed-
term imprisonment, confiscation of property, and in the most serious 
circumstances, the death penalty.29  State-owned organizations and companies 
convicted of bribery are subject to fines, and the employees who are 
directly responsible for the crime are subject to fixed-term imprisonment 
or criminal detention.30  Cases that fall within the AUCL are generally less 
severe, subjecting them only to administrative penalties31 and confiscation 
of illegal income.32 
The Supreme People’s Court33 and Supreme People’s Procuratorate34 
have recently clarified and expanded upon bribery enforcement, focusing 
on the penalties for bribe-givers.35  The guidance establishes monetary 
thresholds for individual bribes to state officials, grading various ranges 
of payments from “serious circumstances” of bribery to “major loss to 
national interest” and pairing respective penalties for each offense.36  It 
also expands the scope of “improper benefits” in bribery offenses to 
include “violating principles of fairness and justice to gain a competitive 
advantage [in] economic, organizational personnel management or other 
activity.”37  One other notable section of the interpretation provides that 
any individual or corporate entity accused of bribery who voluntarily 
 
 27.  Spencer S. Griffith & Yuanming Wang, Chinese Anti-Bribery Law: An Overview of 
the Chinese Laws and Their Importance to Foreign Companies Doing Business in China 
—Part I, METRO. CORP. COUNSEL, Aug. 2010, at 11, http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/ 
pdf/2010/August/11.pdf. 
 28.  Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 16, art. 164. 
 29.  Id. arts. 163–64, 383, 386. 
 30.  Id. art. 387. 
 31.  Griffith & Wang, supra note 27. 
 32.  Law Against Unfair Competition of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 
17, art. 22. 
 33.  The Supreme People’s Court is the highest judicial court in China. XIANFA § 7, 
art. 127 (2004) (China), http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Constitution/2007-11/15/content_ 
1372991.htm. 
 34.  The Supreme People’s Procuratorate is the highest agency in China that exercises 
and supervises prosecutorial authority at all state and local levels. Id. § 7, art. 132. 
 35.  See The Supreme People’s Court and Supreme People’s Procuratorate 
Interpretation on Several Issues Regarding the Specific Application of Law in Handling 
Criminal Cases of Bribery (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct. and Sup. People’s Proc., 
effective Jan. 1, 2013) (China), http://chinalawtranslate.com/en/spc-spp-interpretation-on-
bribery-crimes. 
 36.  Id. arts. 1–4. 
 37.  Id. art. 12. 
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confesses before prosecution begins may potentially receive a reduced 
punishment or a waiver of punishment.38  The individual or entity may also 
receive some leniency if it truthfully confesses to bribery post-prosecution.39 
A.  Bribery of Officials 
The Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) of the CPC 
regulates and enforces Party discipline.40  The committee has the authority 
to implement anti-corruption policies, examine corruption cases, and punish 
corrupt members,41 but the most it can do is expel officials from the CPC.42  
The CCDI operates outside of the legal system, so it does not require 
investigators to obtain warrants before seizing evidence.43  Furthermore, it 
has the power to imprison and interrogate any Party official.44 
Since China’s current president, Xi Jinping, launched his anti -
corruption campaign in late 2012,45 the country has seen unprecedented 
targeting of government officials.  The CCDI investigated approximately 
182,000 party members in 2013 alone46 and disciplined 62,953 officials 
from January to May 2014, an increase of 34.7% over the same period in 
2013.47  The CPC further stressed its focus on curbing corruption by 
establishing a five-year (2013-2017) plan to build a system to punish and 
prevent corruption.48  The plan calls for more severe punishments and 
emphasizes dealing with cases that involve power-for-money deals, judicial 
 
 38.  Id. art. 7. 
 39.  Id. art. 8. 
 40.  Information Office of the State Council of China, China’s Efforts to Combat 
Corruption and Build a Clean Government (White Paper), EMBASSY OF CHINA IN THE 
REPUBLIC OF INDIA (Dec. 12, 2010), http://in.china-embassy.org/eng/xwfw/xxfb/t782350.htm. 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  William Wan, Secretive Agency Leads Most Intense Anti-Corruption Effort in 
Modern Chinese History, WASH. POST, July 2, 2014, available at http://www.washington 
post.com/world/asia_pacific/secretive-agency-leads-most-intense-anti-corruption-effort-in- 
modern-chinese-history/2014/07/02/48aff932-cf68-11e3-937f-d3026234b51c_story.html. 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Upon taking the Party leadership, President Xi Jingping vowed to catch both 
“tigers” and “flies”—both powerful and lowly officials. Andrew Jacobs, China Presses 
Crackdown Against Graft, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/ 
04/22/world/asia/china-expands-crackdown-on-anticorruption-activists.html. 
 46.  Linling Wei & Bob Davis, ‘Shock and Awe’: Meet China’s Top Enforcer, WALL 
ST. J., Aug. 21, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/articles/chinas-top-graft-buster-probing-
thousands-1408588202. 
 47.  Russell Leigh Moses, To No End: Why China’s Corruption Crackdown Won’t 
Be Stopping Soon, WALL ST. J., July 21, 2014, http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2014/ 
07/21/to-no-end-why-chinas-corruption-crackdown-wont-be-stopping-soon/. 
 48. 2013-2017 Work Plan for Establishing and Completing Systems for The 
Punishment and Prevention of Corruption (promulgated by the 18th Nat’l Cong. of the 
CPC), http://chinalawtranslate.com/en/2013-2017-anti-corruption-plan/. 
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corruption, major violations of political discipline, corruption-induced 
mass incidents, commercial bribery, and official selection.49 
Furthermore, President Xi is specifically targeting Party officials by 
passing regulations.  For example, the anti-extravagance campaign prohibits 
officials from spending public money on luxury goods, and accepting 
expensive gifts.50  This campaign attempts to combat the increasing wealth 
gap, diminish the appearance of official corruption in the country, and 
eliminate lavish gift-giving as a form of bribery.51  The CPC is also attempting 
to impede formation of illegal deals between officials and business 
executives by advising them to refrain from inherently personal activities, 
such as vacationing with other party members, playing mahjong52 and 
poker, and spending public money on “study visits” to famous attractions.53  
Additionally, to ensure that only those loyal to the party will manage them, 
the CPC will cut the salaries of top executives at some of China’s largest 
state-owned companies at the end of 2014.54 These executives will also 
lose other benefits, such as golf-club memberships, gym memberships, 
and physical therapy cards.55 Moreover, the CPC has extended its efforts 
to locate and capture several corrupt officials and suspects who have fled 
the country.56 
The investigations of China’s most high-ranking officials, including Bo 
Xilai, Liu Tienan, Xu Caihou, and Zhou Yongkang, signify the CPC’s 
determination to eliminate corruption.  The CPC sentenced Bo Xilai, a retired 
party chief of Chongqing, to life in prison for bribe-taking, embezzlement, 
 
 49.  See China Focus: China Maintains Pressure with 5-year Anticorruption Plan, 
XINHUA NEWS AGENCY (Dec. 25, 2013), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-
12/26/c_132996415.htm. 
 50.  Laura Burkitt, China’s Frugality Fight Claims New Casualties, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 
6, 2013), http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2013/02/06/local-figures-tv-ads-take-hit-from- 
corruption-push/. 
 51.  See id. 
 52.  Chun Han Wong, Chinese Communist Party Members Urged to Abstain from 
Mahjong, Other ‘Small Thrills,’ WALL ST. J. (Oct. 28, 2014), http://blogs.wsj.com/chinareal 
time/2014/10/28/chinese-communist-party-members-urged-to-abstain-from-mahjong-other- 
small-thrills (defining mahjong as a tile-based game commonly played by four players). 
 53.  See id.  
 54.  Linling Wei & Bob Davis, China’s Assault on Corruption Enters Executive 
Suite, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 26, 2014), available at http://online.wsj.com/articles/chinas-assault- 
on-corruption-enters-executive-suite-1414345082. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  See 88 nailed in China’s int’l manhunt for fugitives, CHINADAILY.COM (Sept. 
21, 2014), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-09/21/content_18634312.htm. 
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and abuse of power.57  It also sentenced Liu Tienan, former deputy director 
of the National Development and Reform Commission and former head 
of the National Energy Administration, to life in prison58 after he admitted 
at trial to accepting millions of dollars in bribes.59  The CPC Political Bureau 
expelled Xu Caihou, the retired vice-chairman of China’s Central Military 
Commission, from the CPC for accepting bribes for himself and through 
family members, and using his position to promote others.60  Most recently, 
the CPC arrested Zhou Yongkang, a retired domestic security chief and 
formerly one of China’s top nine leaders, in late 2014 for leaking state 
secrets and taking advantage of his position for financial gain.61  The most 
notable aspect of these investigations is that the CPC is targeting senior 
officials who previously enjoyed de facto immunity.62  By investigating 
Zhou Yongkang, the CPC rejected the decades-old unwritten rule that 
exempted incumbent and retired Politburo Standing Committee63 members 
from investigation for corruption.64  However, prosecution of these members 
will still require approval of the incumbent Standing Committee.65 
While the Party tries corruption cases in court, the judiciary does not 
engage in independent decision making due to the construction of the 
judiciary and the CPC’s absolute power.66  The hierarchical structure of 
the judiciary permits Party-leaders or court-leaders to instruct a subordinate 
 
 57. Michael Wines, In Rise and Fall of Chinese Boss, a Ruthless Arc, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 7, 2012, at A1; see also Edward Wong, China: Court Rejects Appeal By Fallen Chinese 
Official, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2013, at A6. 
 58.  See Josh Chin, China Sentences Liu Tienan to Life in Prison, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 
10, 2014), available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-sentences-liu-tienan-to-life-in-
prison-xinhua-says-1418179307. 
 59.  See James Areddy, World News: Chinese Ex-Official Admits to Corruption, 
WALL ST. J., Sept. 25, 2014, at A16. 
 60.  See An Baijie, Top-level General Expelled for Graft, CHINADAILY.COM (July 1, 
2014), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-07/01/content_17627820.htm. 
 61.  See James T. Areddy, China’s Communist Party Ejects Former Security Chief 
Zhou, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 5 2014), available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-communist- 
party-ejects-former-security-chief-zhou-1417798750. 
 62.  Minxin Pei, Opinion, Crony Communism in China, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/18/opinion/crony-communism-in-china.html. 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  See Benjamin Kang Lim & Ben Blanchard, China’s Ex-Security Chief Helping 
Probe, Not Target: Sources, REUTERS (Sept. 4, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
2013/09/04/us-china-politics-idUSBRE9830D220130904. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Walking on Thin Ice: Control, Intimidation and Harassment of Lawyers in 
China, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (2008) [hereinafter Human Rights Watch], http://www. 
hrw.org/reports/2008/china0408/5.htm (statement of former SPC President Xio Yang) 
(“The power of the courts to adjudicate independently doesn’t mean at all independence 
from the Party. It is the opposite, the embodiment of a high degree of responsibility vis-à-
vis Party undertakings.”). 
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judge to rule on a case in a specific way.67  This decision-making mechanism 
can allow the personal preferences of a leader or judge to prevail without 
regard to legal interpretation and adjudication.68  Since these subordinate 
judges are required to follow the chief decision-maker’s instruction, they 
are forced to either misrepresent the fact-finding process or the meaning 
of the law to support the predetermined outcome of a case, thus undermining 
the independence of both the judiciary and the rule of law.69 As a result, 
application of this practice has perpetuated a form of corruption within 
the judicial system.70 
The underlying reason for this approach lies within the principle of the 
“leadership of the Communist Party.”71  Historically, the CPC has opposed 
the idea of an independent judiciary72 and has maintained unchallenged 
rule over China.73 Furthermore, because the CPC is concerned with its 
reputation,74 it will heavily censor information released to the public 
regarding corrupt Party members to avoid the possibility of humiliating 
the regime.75  A related risk to the CPC in accusing a state official of 
bribery is that it may also implicate other Party members.  Thus, any sensitive 
information concerning past investigations is kept under tight supervision 
and requires special clearance for access.76  For these reasons, corruption 
cases begin with a pre-investigation phase which can only proceed to an 
official investigation if the high-ranking Party leaders, including members 
of the Standing Committee, approve it.77  However, by the time it reaches 
that stage, a finding of guilt is often inevitable and the CPC has essentially 
 
 67.  See Ling Li, The “Production” of Corruption in China’s Courts, 38 USALI (2011), 
http://usali.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/The-production-of-corruption-in-Chinas-courts.pdf. 
 68.  See id. at 40. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  See, e.g., CPC Names Corrupt Judicial Officials, CHINADAILY.COM (Sept. 29, 
2014), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-09/29/content_18682687.htm. 
 71.  See Human Rights Watch, supra note 66. 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  SUSAN V. LAWRENCE & MICHAEL F. MARTIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41007, 
UNDERSTANDING CHINA’S POLITICAL SYSTEM 14 (2013), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/ R41007.pdf. 
 74.  F. Joseph Warin, Michael S. Diamant & Jill M. Pfenning, FCPA Compliance 
in China and the Gifts and Hospitality Challenge, 5 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 33, 41 (2010),  
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/Warin-Diamant-FCPAComplianceIn 
China.pdf. 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  William Wan, How the Secretive, Powerful Agency in Charge of Investigating 
Corrupt Chinese Officials Works, WASH. POST (July 3, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost. 
com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/07/03/how-the-communist-party-investigates-its-own/. 
 77.  Id. 
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decided the disposition of the case.78  As a result of censorship and secrecy, 
the courts and Party, more motivated by politics, often do not fairly 
adjudicate corruption cases involving Party officials. 
Political motivations may also help explain why rampant corruption 
still exists despite the widespread publication of corruption cases.79  In the 
past decade, the CPC’s focus on capturing high-ranking individuals resulted 
because of internal power struggles and economic concerns.80  The Party 
often targeted members of competing factions to weaken political rivals 
and their corporate supporters.81  For example, the CPC convicted four 
employees of Rio Tinto, a British-Australian mining company, of bribery 
charges in 2009.82  The Rio Tinto investigation was alleged to have been 
politically motivated because the company was competing with the 
government’s steel industry over iron ore prices.83  In the present context, 
many believe President Xi also had political motives to arrest Zhou 
Yongkang because Zhou worked closely with Bo Xilai—Xi’s political 
adversary.84  However, the incentives behind President Xi’s anti-corruption 
drive remain unclear because the campaign still remains a high priority,85 
despite the fact that he has already captured and punished several high-
ranking political enemies. 
B.  Compliance with the UNCAC 
The UNCAC has 140 signatories and 172 parties,86 and it seeks to combat 
corruption by encouraging cooperation between participating countries 
and maintaining the ideals of fairness, responsibility, and equality.87  The 
main goals of the Convention are prevention, criminalization, international 
cooperation, and asset recovery.88  Member states are required to criminalize 
 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  See David Barboza, Politics Permeates Anti-Corruption Drive in China, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 3, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/04/business/global/04corrupt.html.  
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  Id.  
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Andrew Browne, Elites Tremble as Xi Cleans House, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 5, 
2014), http://online.wsj.com/articles/elites-tremble-as-xi-cleans-house-1407222978. 
 85.  See Highlights of Communique of 4th Plenary Session of CPC Central 
Committee, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY (Oct. 23, 2014), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/ 
china/2014-10/23/c_133737957.htm. 
 86.  UNCAC Signature and Ratification Status as of 1 September 2014, U.N. OFFICE 
ON DRUGS AND CRIME, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html (last 
visited Oct. 14, 2014). 
 87.  UNCAC, supra note 19, at preamble. 
 88.  Id. 
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the bribery of national and foreign public officials89 and to establish sanctions 
proportional to the seriousness of the bribery offense.90 
The Convention requires member nations to develop a “comprehensive 
and multidisciplinary approach” to prevent and correct corruption.91  Each 
party must also develop “effective, proportionate, and dissuasive criminal 
and non-criminal sanctions, including monetary sanctions.”92  Since the 
UNCAC Conference of the States Parties did not discuss the topic of 
implementation in initial negotiations,93 it therefore grants its members a 
large degree of discretion on the method of implementation and 
enforcement of the Convention’s requirements in their national laws.94  
Thus, while China has indeed amended its criminal law to conform to the 
requirements of the UNCAC, it has approached the implementation process 
rather cautiously and independently.95  The country’s belief that implementation 
should only be assessed by the government itself contrasts with many 
Western countries’ advocacy of both peer and expert review.96  The CPC 
is reluctant to engage in peer review most likely because it fears that it 
may uncover even greater deficiencies within the government and thereby 
expose how truly pervasive corruption actually is in PRC.97 
C.  Commercial Bribery 
The AUCL provides the primary legal framework for administrative 
liability and commercial bribery, and prohibits transactions in which a 
business operator gives the recipient a bribe in order to obtain business or 
some other illegitimate business benefit.98  The AUCL also proscribes the 
use of off-the-books kickbacks to secure a sale.99  The Criminal Law 
 
 89.  Id. arts. 15–16. 
 90.  Id. art. 30. 
 91.  Id. at preamble. 
 92.  Id. art. 26. 
 93.  Margaret K. Lewis, Corruption: Spurring China to Engage in International 
Law, China Rts. F., no. 1 90, 91 (2009), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1432467. 
 94.  Philippa Webb, The United Nations Convention Against Corruption: Global 
Achievement or Missed Opportunity? , 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 191, 221 (2005), http:// 
pustakahpi.kemlu.go.id/dir_dok/UNCAC-Global-Achievement-or-Missed-Opportunity.pdf. 
 95.  Lewis, supra note 93, at 92. 
 96.  Id. at 91. 
 97.  Id. at 92. 
 98.  See Law Against Unfair Competition of the People’s Republic of China, supra 
note 17, art. 8. 
 99.  Id. 
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proscribes giving employees of companies, enterprises or other entities 
bribes for the purpose of obtaining unlawful benefits.100  The AUCL 
provisions treat corruption cases differently from the Criminal Law because 
it does not set any thresholds for the monetary value of bribes involved 
and encompasses a broader scope of activities.101 
The State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC) and county- 
level and above Administrations for Industry and Commerce (AICs) enforce 
the AUCL.102  The AICs conduct special enforcement campaigns to shut 
down public enterprises and other monopolized businesses that abuse their 
monopoly positions to conduct coercive transactions.103  Additionally, the 
AICs seek to prevent, investigate, and conduct cases where local governments 
and their departments abuse their administrative powers to eliminate or 
restrict competition.104  These agencies do not regularly publish decisions 
about AUCL violations, but occasional SAIC press releases and a book of 
select anti-monopoly cases published by the SAIC provide at least some 
insight into enforcement practices under the AUCL.105 
There has been an increased emphasis on enforcement against commercial 
bribery in response to the business culture in China, particularly in the 
pharmaceutical industry.106  After China began overhauling its healthcare 
industry in 2009, many multinational pharmaceutical companies have come 
under scrutiny.107  The leading case in this matter is GlaxoSmithKline’s 
(GSK) investigation and its subsequent conviction for bribery.108  Following 
allegations of widespread bribery in June 2013, GSK’s former China 
executive, Mark Reilly, hired investigator Peter Humphrey and his wife 
Yu Yingzeng to conduct an internal investigation, but the corporate 
 
 100.  Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 16, art. 164. 
 101.  See generally Law Against Unfair Competition of the People’s Republic of 
China, supra note 17 (illustrating that the AUCL prohibits bribery by “other means,” but 
neither explicitly defines this term nor provides examples).  
 102.  H. STEPHEN HARRIS, JR. ET. AL., ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW AND PRACTICE IN CHINA 
333, 344 (2011). 
 103.  Id. at 333. 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  See Laurie Burkitt, China Raises the Heat on Glaxo: State News Outlets Run 
Reports Saying Pressure to Sell Led to Corruption at Drug Maker, WALL ST. J., Sept. 3, 
2013, at A.18. 
 107.  See Lauren Burkitt, China: A Risky Bet for Drug Makers, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 21, 
2013), http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2013/10/21/china-an-increasingly-risky-bet-for-drug- 
makers/. 
 108.  See Laurie Burkitt & Jeanne Whalen, China Targets Big Pharma; GlaxoSmithKline 
Hit With Bribery Allegations as Health-Care Sector Soars, WALL ST. J. (July 16, 2013), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323664204578607502156860618. 
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investigators found no evidence of corruption or bribery.109  Chinese officials 
began a separate investigation one month later and accused GSK’s senior 
executives of using travel agencies to offer kickbacks to government 
officials, hospitals, and doctors to sell more drugs at higher prices.110  
After a secret one-day trial, the court imposed a fine of approximately 
$500 million on the company and sentenced five of GSK’s company 
managers, including Reilly, to potential prison terms of up to four years 
for bribing nongovernmental officials.111  GSK made a statement taking 
full responsibility of its actions, but did not make a statement regarding 
bribery of government personnel due to the sensitivity of the topic.112  The 
CPC will expel Reilly, a British national, from China after his four-year 
suspended prison sentence.113  The court gave Reilly a more lenient sentence 
because he voluntarily returned to China, assisted with the investigation 
and confessed to bribery.114 
III.  IMPACT OF ANTI-CORRUPTION EFFORTS IN CHINA 
Attempts to quell government spending by officials have had an 
unintended effect on China’s economy, and the inconsistent practices of 
regulatory agencies have deterred many foreign companies from considering 
investing in China.  Moreover, increasing public distrust with the CPC has 
forced the Party to consider developing a truly independent judiciary to 
demonstrate that it is providing a fair adjudication process for those 
accused of bribery.  Lastly, the vague anti-corruption laws and unchecked 
power of the CCDI have dissuaded foreign countries from assisting China 
in capturing officials who have fled to those countries. 
 
 109.  Hester Plumridge, GlaxoSmithKline Found Guilty of Bribery in China U.K. 
Drug Maker Handed Largest Ever Corporate Fine in China, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 19, 2014), 
http://online.wsj.com/articles/glaxosmithkline-found-guilty-of-bribery-in-china-1411114817. 
 110.  David Barboza, Glaxo Used Travel Firms For Bribery, China Says, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 16, 2013, at B1. 
 111.  Keith Bradsher & Chris Buckely, China Fines GlaxoSmithKline Nearly $500 
Million in Bribery Case, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/20/ 
business/international/gsk-china-fines.html. 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  Plumridge, supra note 109. 
 114.  Id. 
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A.  China’s Economy 
The CPC’s campaigns to reduce extravagance and waste have caused 
the luxury industry to suffer in China.115  According to an annual luxury 
goods study, growth in China’s luxury market has slowed from 7% in 
2012 to 2% in 2013.116  The ban on giving and receiving gifts has 
eliminated much of the luxury good purchases in China, causing a large 
drop in sales particularly for the watch and menswear departments.117  An 
estimated 2% drop in China’s luxury goods sales marks the first decline 
in sales after over a decade of growth.118  Wal-Mart Stores Inc. sales in 
China have declined 1.6% in 2014 from 2013 due to a decreased sale in 
gift cards, moon cakes, and other gift-giving goods.119  The food and alcohol 
industries have also experienced significant deceleration of growth due to 
cuts on lavish spending, and five-star hotels have voluntarily demoted 
themselves to four-stars to appear less luxurious.120 
Officials have significantly reduced government spending on receptions, 
travel, and vehicles, and the number of officials traveling overseas has 
been cut by 44% in 2013.121  Fear of corruption has also prevented many 
officials from spending government money on new projects.122  The 
reduction of Party officials’ benefits and the risk of corruption accusations 
has also triggered several officials to leave their government positions for 
the private sector.123  Thus far, the CPC has accused over 30,000 officials 
 
 115.  He Wei, Luxury Market Cooling Down, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY (Dec. 18, 2013), 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-12/18/c_132976573.htm. 
 116.  Id.  
 117.  Id. 
 118.  Manuela Mesco, Luxury Goods Sales Set to Fall in Russia and China, WALL 
ST. J. (Oct. 14, 2014),  http://online.wsj.com/articles/luxury-goods-sales-set-to-fall-in-russia- 
and-china-1413296208. 
 119.  Laurie Burkitt, Wal-Mart Feels Pinch From China Austerity Campaign: 
Executive Cites Drop in Sales of Gift Cards and Goods Tied to Culture of Gift Giving, 
WALL ST. J. (Nov. 9, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/articles/wal-mart-says-china-sales-hurt-
by-nations-austerity-campaign-1415550596. 
 120.  Adam Taylor, No More Shark Fins, Whiskey and Prada: The Strange Signs of 
China’s corruption Crackdown, WASH. POST (Apr. 9, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost. 
com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/04/09/no-more-shark-fins-whiskey-and-prada-the-strange- 
signs-of-chinas-corruption-crackdown/. 
 121.  James T. Areddy, New Frugality Puts Strain on Chinese Firms: Anticorruption 
Campaign Dashes Peak Holiday Sales, WALL. ST. J. (Jan. 22, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/ 
news/articles/SB10001424052702304027204579334162357059046. 
 122.  John Sudworth, The Real Costs of China’s Anti-corruption Crackdown, BBC 
NEWS: CHINA BLOG (Apr. 3, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-china-blog-26864134. 
 123.  Wei Gu, Chinese Officials Are Fleeing the Public Sector for the Private: 
Anticorruption Campaign Has Led to Fewer Perks at Government Jobs, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 
4, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/articles/chinese-officials-are-fleeing-the-public-sector-
for-the-private-sector-1409835345. 
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of violating the frugality regulation, but punished only about a quarter of 
them.124 
China’s GDP growth slowed down to 7.4%, its lowest level in 18 
months, in the first quarter of 2014 due to decreased investment and 
consumption.125  The reduction is a result of China’s attempt to restructure 
its economy, as well as the reduction of investment and luxury goods 
sales.126  Bank of America Merrill Lynch predicts that the anti-corruption 
drive will cost more than $100 billion in 2014, and will have burdensome 
economic impacts.127  Luxury spending prohibitions could subtract 0.6% 
to 1.5% from GDP growth by the end of 2014.128 
B.  Foreign Companies 
The GSK case marks a milestone for the enforcement of anti-corruption 
laws in China against foreign companies.  Increased scrutiny within the 
pharmaceutical industry could also lead to inquiries within other commercial 
industries as well.  The case suggests that the CPC requires multinational 
companies doing business in China to take precautions to prevent corruption 
within their China branches.  However, as a result of the absence of SAIC 
interpretations and enforcement procedure publications, there are still few 
guidelines for corporations to follow to seek compliance with the AUCL.129  
Moreover, AIC enforcement practices vary greatly among the different 
provinces and even among cases within the same local authority.130  Many 
U.S. companies find it difficult to conduct business in China because rules 
and regulations generally are neither consistent nor transparent, and the 
judicial system is not entirely independent.131  Widespread corruption in 
China thus creates the unintended result of limiting competition and 
 
 124.  Areddy, supra note 121. 
 125.  Mark Magnier, China GDP Growth Slows to 7.4%, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 16, 2014), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303663604579504400644326182. 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  John Sudworth, The Real Costs of China’s Anti-Corruption Crackdown, BBC.COM 
(Apr. 3, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-china-blog-26864134. 
 128.  Id. 
 129.  HARRIS ET. AL., supra note 102, at 362. 
 130.  Lei Li, Anti-Commercial Bribery Laws in China and Their Enforcement in the 
Pharmaceutical Company, 2 Bloomberg L. Rep. no. 11, 2010, at 4, http://www.sidley.com/ 
files/Publication/acb54f59-1ed7-4b03-aa45-89295b99a2d6/Presentation/Publication 
Attachment/4231337d-e8d1-4764-a2a0-8b4be13f5fc1/sidley_lei_li_article.pdf. 
 131.  See MORRISSON, supra note 1, at 31. 
TRANI (DO NOT DELETE) 10/7/2016  1:13 PM 
 
310 
undermines the efficient allocation of goods and services in the economy.132 
Moreover, government officials often do not enforce anti-corruption laws 
and regulations, so companies do not have any incentive to comply with 
industry regulations.133 
In addition to concerns over the clarity of anti-corruption laws, international 
businesses believe China is unfairly targeting foreign companies.134  A 
survey conducted by the American Chamber of Commerce in China 
revealed that 60% of companies feel less welcome in China, and 49% of 
companies believe China is targeting foreign firms.135  The lack of transparency 
in enforcement efforts has caused many foreign companies to look less 
favorably upon China as an investment destination.136 
The rising number of anti-corruption investigations also means that 
multinational companies under investigation will need to consider the 
possibility of handling parallel investigations of conduct by China and the 
entity’s home country.137  Companies may also need to reevaluate the 
strength and thoroughness of investigation standards within the company 
because they may not sufficiently meet China’s standards.138  Finally, as 
the media discloses more investigations, foreign companies may need to 
update their own programs to reflect industry-specific rules. 
C.  China’s Rule of Law 
The powerful, yet secretive CCDI and the CPC-controlled judicial 
system are emblematic of the relative lack of rule of law in China.  
Widespread corruption in the judiciary during Zhou Yongkang’s period 
in office as domestic security chief meant that the CPC’s main priority 
was stability maintenance, not adherence to the rule of law.139  Zhou’s 
 
 132.  Id. 
 133.  Id. 
 134.  Andrew Browne & Laurie Burkitt, U.S. Firms Feel Unwelcome in China, According 
to Survey; U.S. Companies Say They Have Become Targets of China’s Antimonopoly and 
Anticorruption Campaigns, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 1, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-
firms-feel-less-welcome-in-china-1409624607. 
 135.  Id. 
 136.  Id. 
 137.  Henry Chen, Pharma Bribe Probe Points to China Parallel Prosecutions, 
FCPA BLOG (July 11, 2013, 2:18 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2013/7/11/pharma-
bribe-probe-points-to-china-parallel-prosecutions.html. 
 138.  See Christopher Matthews & Jessica Hodgson, GlaxoSmithKline Probes Bribe 
Allegations in China, WALL ST. J. (June 12, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001 
424127887324798904578529413574312372 (discussing that GSK performed its own 
investigations before China stepped in, but found no evidence of bribery with respect to 
payments to doctors in China). 
 139.  James T. Areddy, Anticorruption Agency Gains Power in China, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 
17, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/articles/anticorruption-agency-gains-power-in-china-141359 
0068. 
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capture indicates how deeply ingrained corruption is within the Chinese 
government, but also demonstrates President Xi’s commitment to eradicating 
it. 
Thus far, the anti-corruption drive has focused on targeting and 
punishing high-ranking individuals.  The process by which the CCDI 
investigates officials, termed “shang-gui,”140 provides no due process and 
instills fear in Party members.  While the CCDI’s focus on harsh punishments 
for corruption undeniably deters officials from accepting bribes and solves 
some existing problems, the CPC must take stronger efforts to prevent the 
reemergence of corruption.  Party officials want to comply with existing 
laws, but the lack of clarity of anti-bribery laws imposes unnecessary 
pressure on them.141 
SPC President Zhou Qiang acknowledged the existing issues in the 
judicial system at the 12th National People’s Congress.142  He expressed 
interest in creating a more independent judiciary and preventing Party 
officials from influencing court decisions in order to protect the credibility 
of the court.143  However, another problem lies in the fact that judges are 
appointed by local officials,144 so regardless of whether officials interfere 
in decisions, judges may rule in favor of those officials due to Party 
loyalty.  China has made prior judicial reform efforts in 2012,145 but the 
recent charges of judicial corruption emphasize the need for more 
improvements and enforcement of the rules. 
China’s rule of law was the central theme at the 4th Plenary Session of 
the 18th CPC Central Committee, which began on October 20, 2014.146  
That meeting further advanced the concept of China’s rule of law under 
the CPC leadership147 and introduced experiments to reduce interference 
in the judicial system by local officials.148  The Central Committee passed 
 
 140.  Areddy, supra note 139 (describing “shang-gui” as a process by which the 
CCID interrogates suspects for months without providing them access to lawyers). 
 141.  See supra Part III.A. 
 142.  Editorial Board, Opinion, China Rethinks its Judicial System, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 
17, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/18/opinion/china-rethinks-its-judicial-system.html. 
 143.  Id. 
 144.  Id. 
 145.  See Information Office of the State Council of The People’s Republic of China 
Judicial Reform in China, White Paper: Judicial Reform in China (Oct. 2012), http://english. 
gov.cn./archive/white_paper/2014/08/23/content_281474983043170.htm. 
 146.  Yang Yi, CPC Sets New Blueprint for Rule of Law, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY 
(Oct. 23, 2013), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-10/23/c_133737845.htm. 
 147.  Id. 
 148.  Areddy, supra note 139. 
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a Decision149 and Communiqué150 following the four-day meeting.  Both 
reports reiterate the CPC’s control over law and legal institutions.151 
Another focus of the meeting addresses the problem of extra-judicial 
interference by local officials, which has intensified public distrust with the 
CPC.152  Proposed solutions include establishing circuit courts that operate 
across jurisdictions and directly report to Beijing, thereby transferring 
authority over financing and hiring staff from the local courts to the 
provincial level, and creating a system for tracking, reporting and punishing 
officials who attempt to influence cases.153  Although the reports recognize 
the importance of creating an independent judiciary to maintain legitimacy, 
they also repeatedly emphasize that the CPC will maintain control over 
the legal system154 as a “fundamental requirement” and “basic safeguard” 
of China’s rule of law.155  The Party also announced plans to combat corruption 
within the military by implementing stricter supervision methods and 
reforming its disciplinary scheme.156 
D.  Developing Cooperation with Foreign Countries 
If China wants to capture individuals who have fled overseas, it must 
provide clear guidance to show how foreign countries can cooperate with 
China’s laws.  The opaque character of the CCDI and unfair legal system 
pose a problem for Western democracies, which results in an unwillingness 
to join forces with China.  However, returning assets and fugitives from 
overseas is an important goal for the CPC.  One study conducted by 
 
 149.  CPC Central Committee Decision concerning Some Major Questions in 
Comprehensively Moving Governing the Country According to the law Forward, CHINA 
COPYRIGHT AND MEDIA (Oct. 28, 2014), http://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/ 
2014/10/28/ccp-central-committee-decision-concerning-some-major-questions-in-comprehensively 
-moving-governing-the-country-according-to-the-law-forward/ [hereinafter CPC Central 
Committee Decision]. 
 150.  Official Central Committee Communiqué on 4th Plenum, CHINA COPYRIGHT 
AND MEDIA (Oct. 23, 2014),  http://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2014/10/23/ 
official-central-committee-communique-on-4th-plenum/. 
 151.  Stanley Lubman, Key Points in China’s Flood of Legal Reform Rhetoric, WALL 
ST. J. (Oct. 30, 2014), http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2014/10/30/key-points-in-chinas- 
flood-of-legal-reform-rhetoric/. 
 152.  Id. 
 153.  Id. 
 154.  CPC Central Committee Decision, supra note 149 (stating the words “under the 
leadership of the Party” several times throughout the Decision). 
 155.  Josh Chin & James T. Areddy, China Vows to Strengthen Judicial System, 
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 23, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/articles/china-vows-to-strengthen-
judicial-system-1414065032. 
 156.  Josh Chin & Brian Spegele, China Signals Greater Oversight of Military, 
Media, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 28, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-signals-greater-
oversight-of-military-media-1414508534. 
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Global Financial Integrity estimated a $2.83 trillion of illegal money 
flowed out of China between 2005 and 2011.157  One example of a foreign 
country’s reluctance to cooperate with China is the case of Lai Changxi, 
one of its most-wanted fugitives who organized a multi-billion dollar 
smuggling ring before fleeing to Canada.158  Although officials arrested 
Lai in Canada one year after he fled, the Canadian courts had refused to 
return him to China for 11 years based on the fear that China’s legal system 
could not guarantee Lai a fair trial.159 
Consequently, the CPC has a strong motivation to implement transparent 
government systems and participate in international cooperation with 
other members of the UNCAC, which the Convention requires.  Success 
in capturing officials and recovering assets will bolster the CPC’s claim 
of its legitimacy and deter potential suspects from fleeing the country to 
avoid punishment.160 
In order to provide incentives for countries to help China track down 
corrupt officials who have fled the country with their illegal assets, China 
recently adopted a common policy among other countries to share up to 
80% of their forfeited assets.161  Most countries require evidence that 
illegal assets exist before engaging in asset recovery,162 but this type of 
evidence is typically difficult to prove because individuals often launder 
these assets in other countries.163  Thus far, Canada and France have agreed 
to share forfeited assets with China.164  China has also signed extradition 
treaties with 38 countries, but not with Canada, Australia, the United 
 
 157.  James Pomfret & Matthew Miller, On China’s Border Underground Banking 
Flourishes, N.Y. TIMES (May 20, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/21/business/ 
global/on-chinas-border-underground-banking-flourishes.html. 
 158.  See Ian Johnson & Michael Wines, Beijing Arrests Its Most-Wanted Fugitive 
After Canada Deports Him, N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/ 
07/24/world/asia/24lai.html?_r=0. 
 159.  Id. 
 160.  Lewis, supra note 93, at 93. 
 161.  Cheng Muyang, China to Share Assets from Fugitives Abroad with Other 
Countries, CHINADAILY.COM (Nov. 3, 2014), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-
11/03/content_18856312.htm. 
 162.  Id. 
 163.  Chen Heying, China to share up to 80% of assets in global corruption manhunt: 
expert, GLOBAL TIMES (Nov. 3, 2014), http://www.bjd.com.cn/10beijingnews/focus/201411/ 
03/t20141103_8185149.html. 
 164.  Hui Zhi, China to Share Fugitives’ assets with Countries assisting the ‘Fox 
Hunt,’ FCPA BLOG (Nov. 13, 2014, 6:38 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2014/ 
11/13/china-to-share-fugitives-assets-with-countries-assisting-the.html. 
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States—three of the most favored places for Chinese fugitives to flee.165  
Australia and the United States refuse to extradite anyone convicted of 
corruption if there is a possibility that the person will receive the death 
penalty.166 
The 21 Asia-Pacific nations of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) forum have also affirmed plans in November 2014 to combat 
regional corruption.167  The anti-corruption network, called Act-Net, will 
be based in China and will run as a subdivision of the CCDI.168  Designed 
to reinforce international agreements such as the UNCAC, Act-Net will 
build a cross-border network that promotes communication flow between 
law enforcement agencies.169  The countries are “committed to denying 
safe haven to those engaged in corruption, including through extradition, 
mutual legal assistance, and the recovery and return of proceeds of 
corruption.”170 
China initially resisted a proposal at the November 2014 G20 summit 
designed to facilitate tracing business ownership, but it eventually agreed 
to support these transparency measures.171  Under this regime, countries 
will share information about the owners of shell companies and trusts 
between law enforcement agencies to pinpoint wealthy individuals who 
could potentially use those entities to evade taxes, launder money, and 
hide corruption.172  China’s promise to disclose that level of information 
underscores its resolve to eradicate corruption.  These measures will likely 
help the CCDI investigate individuals attempting to hide their investments 
though shell companies and cross ownership structures.173 
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 166.  See Muyang, supra note 161; Fergus Ryan, Australia Considers Extradition 
Treaty with China, THE AUSTRALIAN (Nov. 10, 2014), http://www.theaustralian.com.au/ 
business/latest/australia-considers-extradition-treaty-with-china/story-e6frg90f-1227118 
652294. 
 167.  James T. Areddy, China Set to Host Regional Anticorruption Network, WALL 
ST. J. (Nov. 5, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/articles/china-set-to-host-regional-anticorruption- 
network-1415176815. 
 168.  Id. 
 169.  Id. 
 170.  Id. 
 171.  Daniel Stacy & Rob Taylor, China Reverses Opposition to G-20 Anticorruption 
Plan, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 16, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/articles/china-reverses-opposition-to- 
g-20-anticorruption-plan-1416135168. 
 172.  Id. 
 173.  Id. 
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IV.  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT UNDER THE FOREIGN 
CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT AND U.K. BRIBERY ACT 
Congress enacted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in 1977174 
after a series of scandals in which hundreds of U.S. companies had paid 
millions of dollars in bribes to secure business from foreign officials.175  
It amended the FCPA twice: once in 1988 to add affirmative defenses.176 
and once in 1998 to comply with the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention’s 
requirement to include bribery of foreign nationals.177  Generally, the 
FCPA consists of anti-bribery provisions which prohibit the offering of 
bribes and accounting provisions.178 
The United Kingdom passed the Bribery Act in 2010179 to consolidate 
and revise its outdated corruption laws, and also to comply with the OECD 
Convention requirements.180  Prior to this Act, the United Kingdom had 
utilized a patchwork of anti-bribery legislation dating as far back as 1889.181  
The new Bribery Act criminalizes three types of activities: (1) the giving 
and receiving of bribes; (2) the bribery of foreign public officials; and (3) 
the failure of commercial organizations to prevent bribery.182 
The following sections will discuss select aspects of the U.S. and U.K. 
anti-corruption systems and recommend that China adopt or look to these 
provisions for future anti-corruption efforts.  These provisions and enforcement 
methods provide for an efficient and balanced focus on bribery, though 
they may vary in their methods of accomplishing this goal.  Because the 
U.S. and U.K. statutes focus on the supply-side of bribery, they complement 
 
 174.  See generally Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 
Stat. 1494 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78dd-3, 78ff, 78m(b), 
(d)(1), (g)-(h) (2006 & Supp. 2010)) [hereinafter FCPA]. 
 175.  See CRIMINAL DIV. OF DEP’T OF JUSTICE & ENFORCEMENT DIV. OF THE SEC. AND 
EXCH. COMM’N, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT, 3 
(Nov. 14, 2010) [hereinafter FCPA Resource Guide], http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/ 
fcpa/guidance/guide.pdf. 
 176.  See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 
§§ 5001–5003, 102 Stat. 1415, 1424 (1988). 
 177.  See generally International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, 
Pub. L. No. 105-366, §§ 1–6, 112 Stat. 3302 (1998). 
 178.  FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 175, at 2. 
 179.  See generally Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23 [hereinafter Bribery Act], http://www. 
legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/23/pdfs/ukpga_20100023_en.pdf. 
 180.  Bruce W. Bean & Emma H. MacGuidwin, Unscrewing the Inscrutable: The UK 
Bribery Act 2010, 23 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 63, 67–68 (2013). 
 181.  Id. 
 182.  See generally Bribery Act, supra note 179. 
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China’s heavy focus on the demand-side and provide ideas that China may 
borrow to obtain a balance between both aspects of bribery. 
A.  Anti-Bribery Provisions Under the FCPA 
The FCPA anti-bribery provisions prohibit the offer, payment, promise 
to pay, or authorization of payment of anything of value to any foreign 
official, foreign political party, official, or candidate, to obtain or retain 
business.183  These provisions apply to issuers,184 their employees, U.S. 
persons and businesses (“domestic concerns”),185 and certain foreign persons 
or businesses.186  Conduct both inside and outside of the U.S. is covered 
by the FCPA if issuers or domestic concerns use interstate commerce to 
further the corrupt payments to foreign officials.187  Entities other than 
issuers or domestic concerns that directly or indirectly engage in any act 
in furtherance of a corrupt payment while on U.S. territory are also covered 
by the FCPA.188 
The Department of Justice (DOJ), Securities Exchange Commission 
(SEC), and U.S. courts have interpreted the phrase “anything of value” to 
cover a broad range of subjects.189  Forms of payment may include cash, 
charitable contributions, extravagant gifts, travel and entertainment expenses, 
luxuries such as food, travel, meal and lodging expenses, and promises of 
future employment.190  While there is no minimum threshold amount for 
gifts or payments, the DOJ and SEC have historically focused on minor 
payments and gifts only when they are part of a larger and long-standing 
scheme of corruption.191  Furthermore, the FCPA does not bar all forms 
of gift-giving—only those of a type used to disguise bribes.192 
There are two affirmative defenses for the payment, gift, offer, or 
promise of anything of value. First, it is an affirmative defense if the laws 
 
 183.  15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(a). 
 184.  See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a) (defining this group as including domestic and foreign 
companies listed on any U.S. stock exchange or which are required to file reports with the 
SEC). 
 185.  See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(1) (including any individual who is a U.S. citizen, 
national, or resident and any corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock company, 
business trust, unincorporated organization, or sole proprietorship, which has its principal 
place of business in the United States, or which is organized under U.S. laws). 
 186.  See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(f)(1).  
 187.  See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(5). 
 188.  See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(a). 
 189.  Sarah Bartle et. al., Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1265, 
1277 (2014). 
 190.  Id. at 1278; see also FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 175, at 15–19. 
 191.  FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 175, at 15. 
 192.  Id. at 16. 
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of the foreign official’s country consider the conduct lawful.193  Second, 
a defense exists when the act was a reasonable and bona fide expenditure 
incurred on behalf of the foreign official.194  Companies are generally not 
subject to enforcement action by the DOJ or SEC if they pay for items of 
nominal value,195 but they are encouraged to devise their own compliance 
programs and provide guidelines for acceptable gift-giving behavior to 
mitigate potential violations.196 
B.  Anti-Bribery Provisions Under the Bribery Act 
One notable difference between the FCPA and the Bribery Act is that 
the Bribery Act prohibits both the offer and acceptance of bribes, while 
the FCPA prohibits only the offer of bribes.  Furthermore, the Bribery Act 
has merged both domestic and foreign corruption laws into one statute,197 
while the FCPA maintains separate statutes.198  The Bribery Act prohibits 
a person from directly or indirectly offering, promising, or giving a 
financial or other advantage to a foreign public official for the purposes 
of obtaining or retaining business or a competitive advantage.199 
Corporate entities and their officers are also liable for giving bribes, 
regardless of whether the acts take place within the U.K. territory,200 as 
long as the organization or its agents have a “close connection” with the 
U.K.201  However, it is an affirmative defense if the organization can prove 
that it had adequate measures in place to prevent its agent from 
undertaking corrupt conduct.202  Under the FCPA, the Secretary of State203 
has published guidance on how commercial organizations can implement 
procedures to prevent bribery committed on their behalf.204  The following 
 
 193.  15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(c)(1). 
 194.  15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(c)(2). 
 195.  FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 175, at 15 (categorizing items such as cab 
fare, reasonable meals and entertainment expenses as likely acceptable gifts). 
 196.  See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(f) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 
2011). 
 197.  See generally Bribery Act, supra note 179. 
 198.  See 18 U.S.C. § 201. 
 199.  Bribery Act, supra note 179, § 6. 
 200.  Id. § 12(5). 
 201.  Id. § 14. 
 202.  Id. § 7(2). 
 203.  Id. § 9. 
 204.  See Ministry of Justice, The Bribery Act 2010 Guidance, GOV.UK (Mar. 2011), 
http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/legislation/bribery-act-2010-recance.pdf. 
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six principles are established: (1) proportionate procedures; (2) top-level 
commitment; (3) risk assessment; (4) due diligence; (5) communication 
(including training); and (6) monitoring and review.205 
C.  Recommended Anti-Bribery Provisions in China 
Similar to the Bribery Act, the AUCL and PRC Criminal Law prohibit 
both the giving and accepting of bribes by domestic individuals and 
corporations, and also prohibit the giving of bribes to foreign officials.206  
However, unlike the FCPA and Bribery Act, the Criminal Law neither 
mentions differences between direct and indirect giving nor criminalizes 
the offer of bribes to foreign officials.207  In order to effectively enforce 
its laws regarding bribery of foreign officials and conform to domestic 
bribery standards,208 the CPC should amend the existing Criminal Law to 
include these prohibited activities.  Furthermore, it should also amend the 
current laws to meet UNCAC standards.209 
The Criminal Law’s jurisdictional principles govern foreign official 
bribery.210  The SPC and SPP have yet to interpret the provisions governing 
extra-territorial jurisdiction, but the provisions appear to apply to Chinese 
citizens, entities formed under Chinese law, and possibly even individuals 
and entities whose corrupt acts implicate China.211  Adding a provision that 
explicitly provides for extra-territorial jurisdiction may benefit China and 
encourage other countries to assist in the efforts to track down individuals 
who have fled the country. 
The FCPA takes note of varying cultural values in its enforcement against 
corporate gifts or payments by allowing gifts or payments to foreign 
officials if they were reasonable and bona fide expenses, or if they were 
lawful under the laws of the foreign country.212  The AUCL currently does 
not define the phrase “gift or other means” in relation to commercial bribery, 
meaning one can interpret it very broadly to encompass activities that are 
illegal in China, but legal in another country.213  With President Xi’s anti-
 
 205.  Id. 
 206.  See supra Part II. 
 207.  See Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 16, art. 164. 
 208.  Id. arts. 392–93, 398 (stating that the domestic bribery provisions prohibit the 
“offer” and “introduction” of bribes to state officials). 
 209.  UNCAC, supra note 19, art. 6 (requiring each country to define bribery as “the 
promise, offering, or giving to a foreign public official. . .directly or indirectly”).  
 210.  Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 16, arts. 6–8. 
 211.  Samuel R. Gintel, Fighting Transnational Bribery: China’s Gradual Approach, 
31 WIS. INT’L L. J. 1, 14–15 (2013). 
 212.  See supra Part IV.A. 
 213.  Law Against Unfair Competition of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 
17, art. 8. 
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luxury campaign in place, companies and individuals currently do not 
spend money out of fear that the CPC will accuse them of corruption.214  
China’s economy may benefit from a clearer definition of “gift or other 
means,” especially since China has a gift-giving culture that is very 
important. This definition would also allow companies to conform to anti-
corruption provisions while not preventing engagement in normal 
business courtesies, such as small gifts of esteem or gratitude.215  Recent 
investigations into companies such as GSK could potentially lead to more 
judicial interpretations to resolve these vague points in the definition of 
commercial bribery. 
D.  Accounting Provisions Under the FCPA 
FCPA accounting provisions require companies to make annual reports, 
keep accurate records of its transactions, and create internal accounting 
controls.216  These provisions apply to issuers, domestic and foreign 
companies listed on any U.S. stock exchange, or those which are required 
to file reports with the SEC.217  An issuer must comply with accounting 
provisions, regardless of whether it engages in foreign operations or 
bribery violations because the records are the main source of accounting 
fraud and issuer disclosure cases.218 
The FCPA books and records provision requires all issuers to “make and 
keep books, records, and accounts, which in reasonable detail, accurately 
and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the 
issuer.”219  The reasonable detail standard is one that would “satisfy prudent 
officials in the conduct of their own affairs” and balances numerous relevant 
factors, including the cost of compliance.220  The record-keeping and internal 
controls provisions also ensures that a company properly uses its assets, 
encourages accurate recording of improper payments, and prevents the 
mischaracterization of transactions.221 
 
 214.  See supra Part III.A. 
 215.  FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 175, at 15. 
 216.  See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a). 
 217.  See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b). 
 218.  FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 175, at 38. 
 219.  15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A). 
 220.  H.R. REP. NO. 100-418, at 917 (1988), http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/ 
fcpa/history/1988/tradeact-100-418.pdf.  
 221.  FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 175, at 39. 
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The internal controls provision requires issuers to create internal controls 
that reasonably ensure the accurate execution and recording of transactions.222  
Companies have the discretion to develop their own controls to meet their 
particular needs and circumstances, but must take into consideration the 
realities and risks associated with their respective industries.223  The Bribery 
Act does not have accounting provisions, but because it holds commercial 
organizations liable for the failure to prevent bribery,224 companies are 
encouraged to implement their own record-keeping and internal controls. 
E.  Recommended Accounting Provisions for China 
China’s Criminal Law and AUCL currently have provisions that criminalize 
individuals for accepting off-the-book rebates or service charges,225 and 
firms for paying kickbacks and accepting discounts without recording 
them.226 However, China should adopt a more comprehensive record-
keeping provision to help a company’s compliance programs become 
more effective and ensure that a business accurately records its payments.  
Adopting provisions like those of the FCPA will warrant the accountability 
of companies and will also provide sufficient evidence for the CCDI to 
investigate and prosecute a company. 
Additionally, record-keeping provisions create an objective mechanism 
for monitoring corruption because a company’s internal investigators may 
themselves be corrupt.  Providing an affirmative defense like the Bribery 
Act for companies that create adequate anti-bribery procedures and book-
keeping measures would encourage companies to report costs truthfully 
and aid CCDI investigations. Regardless of whether China decides to 
implement these accounting provisions, corporations should still devise 
their own internal compliance programs. 
F.  Enforcement and Penalties Under the FCPA 
The DOJ and SEC enforce the FCPA’s provisions together and work 
with other federal agencies and law-enforcement partners to enforce 
FCPA violations.227  The DOJ has the criminal and civil enforcement 
responsibility for U.S. citizens, nationals, residents, and U.S. businesses 
and their agents, as well as certain foreign persons and businesses. 228  
 
 222.  15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B). 
 223.  FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 175, at 40. 
 224.  Bribery Act, supra note 179, § 7. 
 225.  Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 16, at 387. 
 226.  Law Against Unfair Competition of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 
17, at 8. 
 227.  FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 175, at 4. 
 228.  Id. 
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Additionally, the DOJ has criminal enforcement responsibility over issuers 
and their agents, while the SEC is responsible for civil enforcement 
over issuers and their agents.229  Furthermore, the DOJ maintains a website 
that publishes select FCPA-related prosecutions and resolutions, and copies 
of opinions issued in response to questions by companies and individuals 
that determine whether proposed conduct would be prosecuted under the 
FCPA.230  The U.S. government also utilizes the Departments of Commerce 
and State to assist U.S. companies doing business abroad with corruption 
and bribery-related issues.231  The Department of Commerce has published 
guidelines that help corporations comply with anti-corruption laws.232 
Most cases of commercial bribery under the FCPA are resolved through 
deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) or non-prosecution agreements 
(NPAs).233  In order to obtain or qualify for a settlement agreement through 
these methods, the DOJ and SEC will consider: (1) a firm’s willingness to 
cooperate in the underlying investigation and  (2) whether the firm promoted 
a “culture of compliance.”234  While the prosecution still files a formal 
charging document with the court under a DPA, it defers that prosecution 
if the firm agrees to perform a variety of actions such as paying substantial 
fines, disgorging profits, implementing internal compliance programs, 
and cooperating with any ongoing investigations.235  If the organization 
satisfactorily performs its duties under the agreement after a period of time 
(usually two to four years), the prosecution then dismisses the charges.236  
The process of obtaining a settlement under the NPA is similar to that of 
a DPA, but without the necessity for a formal court filing.237  Companies 
benefit from settlements because they avoid formal prosecution and the 
risks of litigation, while the regulators benefit because settlements 
encourage cooperation with investigators.238 
 
 229.  Id. 
 230.  Id. 
 231.  Id. at 5–6. 
 232.  See Business Ethics: A Manual for Managing a Responsible Business Enterprise in 
Emerging Market Economies, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, http://www.ita.doc.gov/good 
governance/business_ethics/manual.asp (last visited Nov. 6, 2014). 
 233.  Joseph W. Yockey, FCPA Settlement, Internal Strife, and the “Culture of 
Compliance,” 2012 WIS. L. REV. 689, 697 (2012). 
 234.  Id. at 698–99. 
 235.  Id. at 697. 
 236.  Id. 
 237.  Yockey, supra note 233 (stating that regulators still retain the right to file charges, 
but will not do so if the firm complies with the same terms as DPAs). 
 238.  Id. at 698. 
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G.  Enforcement and Penalties Under the Bribery Act 
The U.K. Serious Fraud Office (SFO) is the primary agency that 
investigates and prosecutes violations of the Bribery Act.239  The SFO has 
issued informative guidance intended to provide insight as to how 
prosecutors will decide whether to prosecute a case.240  The guidance 
notes that the Bribery Act focuses on commercial bribery, but also notes 
that the Government will gradually shift to combatting international 
bribery.241  In deciding whether to prosecute a case, the prosecutor must 
consider, first, if there is sufficient evidence to justify a prosecution and, 
second, if public interest weighs in favor of prosecution.242 
While the SFO has entered settlement agreements in the past with firms, 
the judiciary and the OECD have heavily criticized it for doing so.243  
Because of this reaction, the U.K. has been unable to conclude global 
settlement agreements in criminal proceedings.244  Nevertheless, in February 
2014, the Criminal Procedure Rule Committee added DPA agreements to 
the U.K. Criminal Procedure Rules as another method for dealing with 
corporate bribery cases.245  Much like the U.S., the U.K. added DPAs to 
incentivize cooperation by offering court-sanctioned written settlements 
for companies and to avoid the risks inherent in litigation and the 
potentially fatal consequences of conviction in criminal courts.246  
Prosecutors now hope that having four High Court judges specially 
appointed to deal with DPAs and providing a formal, statutory basis for 
DPAs will also encourage resolutions between international investigations.247 
 
 239.  See Who We Are, Serious Fraud Office, SERIOUS FRAUD OFFICE, http://www. 
sfo. gov.uk/about-us/who-we-are.aspx (last visited Nov. 10, 2014). 
 240.  See U.K. SFO & Crown Prosecution Service, Bribery Act 2010: Joint 
Prosecution Guidance of the Director of the Serious Fraud Office and the Director of 
Public Prosecutions, 2, http://www.sfo.gov.uk/media/167348/bribery_act_2010_joint_ 
prosecution_guidance_of_the_director_of_the_serious_fraud_office_and_the_director_of 
_public_prosecutions.pdf. 
 241.  Id. at 3. 
 242.  Id. at 4–5. 
 243.  Kevin Roberts & Duncan Grieve, The American Way – DPAs arrive in the U.K., 
MORRISON & FOERSTER, Feb. 6, 2014, at 1–2, http://media.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/ 
140206-DPAs-UK.pdf (stating that Justice Thomas disapproved of the SFO Director’s 
choice to settle with a defendant company); see also Dominic Saglibene, The U.K. Bribery 
Act: A Benchmark for Anti-Corruption Reform in the United States, 23 TRANSNAT’L L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 119, 134 (2014) (stating that the OECD criticized the SFO for overusing 
civil settlements for corporate cases of foreign bribery instead of criminal sanctions). 
 244.  Roberts & Grieve, supra note 243, at 2. 
 245.  See The Criminal Procedure Rules 2014, SI 2014/1610, pt. 12 (Eng. & Wales), 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2014/1610/pdfs/uksi_20141610_en.pdf. 
 246.  Roberts & Grieve, supra note 243, at 1. 
 247.  Id. 
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H.  Recommended Enforcement Procedures in China 
Both the U.S. and U.K. have appointed independent agencies to enforce 
their anti-corruption laws and maintain a balance between investigating 
domestic and foreign entities.  While China has appointed the CCDI to 
enforce its anti-corruption laws, the CCDI currently has too much power, 
conducts highly secretive methods to investigate suspects, and does not 
operate independently of the CPC.248  Furthermore, rather than maintaining a 
balance between investigating foreign and domestic individuals, China 
has committed itself to unprecedented searches of domestic officials, 
making the convictions seem more politically motivated.249 
China should consider adopting an independent agency in order to 
dispense justice fairly and encourage firms to further cooperate with 
investigators.  Creating a website for the independent investigative agency 
similar to that maintained by the DOJ would allow individuals and 
companies to inquire about whether certain conduct is punishable by law.  
This instrument would not only provide a valuable source of information 
of individuals and companies, but also would help articulate and develop 
the PRC Criminal Law and AUCL anti-bribery provisions.  Additionally, 
by publishing select prosecutions and resolutions online, the CPC can 
fully explain why it prosecuted certain individuals or companies, thus 
bolstering transparency in the anti-corruption framework.  The CCDI may 
also consider constructing such a website regardless of whether the CPC 
establishes an independent agency, in order to fully explain its decision-
making process and provide guidance on what types of practices are 
unacceptable. 
Furthermore, China should create an independent judiciary to adjudicate a 
fair trial, which will lead to more transparency and effectiveness 
in enforcement efforts.  Although newly announced reforms will assist in 
reducing officials from influencing judicial decisions, it is too early to 
determine how effective these measure will be because the CPC has  
continued to assert control over the judiciary.250 
Currently, criminal charges are the principal means of enforcing anti-
corruption laws, but China could also benefit from utilizing settlement 
agreements as an alternative to prosecution.  This would correspondingly 
follow Confucian principles of conciliation.  By offering DPAs, China can 
 
 248.  See supra Part II.  
 249.  See supra Part II.  
 250.  See supra Part III.C. 
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effectively provide companies with an opportunity to comply with anti-
corruption laws, cooperate with investigators, and facilitate monitoring of 
businesses before inevitably resorting to prosecution.  This will force the 
CPC to provide clear guidelines that will allow companies to implement 
suitable compliance programs.  Appointing judges specifically charged to 
deal with settlements would also allow the judiciary to check the CCDI’s 
power.  At the very least, the CCDI should follow the DOJ and SFO’s 
steps and publish guidance concerning the anti-corruption provisions of 
the Criminal Law and AUCL.  More defined rules and increased effective 
enforcement will encourage more foreign companies to conduct business 
in China, thus boosting the economy’s long-term prospects.251 
V.  OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION 
The OECD, established in 1961 to promote global economic and social 
development, adopted the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign 
Public Officials in International Business Transactions (“OECD Convention”) 
in 1997.252  The convention obliges the parties to criminalize foreign public 
official bribery in international business transactions,253 outline criminal 
penalties for these violations,254 establish accounting provisions,255 and 
provide assistance to other signatories in investigations and proceedings 
against those charged with bribery.256  Currently, all 34 OECD members 
are parties to the Anti-Bribery Convention as well as seven non-member 
countries.257  The OECD Working Group on Bribery, which is comprised 
of representatives from each of the member states, supervises the convention. 
A.  Working Group on Bribery 
The Working Group is responsible for monitoring the implementation 
of the Anti-Bribery Convention, the 2009 Recommendation of the Council 
for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International 
 
 251.  See supra Part III.B. 
 252.  See Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions, Organization for Economic Development, Nov. 21, 
1997, 37 I.L.M. 1 (1998) [hereinafter OECD Convention], http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-
bribery/ConvCombatBribery_ENG.pdf. 
 253.  See id. art. 1. 
 254.  See id. art. 3. 
 255.  See id. art. 8. 
 256.  See id. art. 9. 
 257.  See OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions: Ratification Status as of 21 May 2014, OECD (May 
2014), http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/WGBRatificationStatus.pdf. 
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Business Transactions,258 and other related instruments.  Its members 
meet quarterly to review and monitor implementation of the Anti-Bribery 
Convention by member states around the world.  Each party undergoes 
three phases of periodic peer review.  Phase 1 includes an in-depth evaluation 
of whether each country’s domestic laws have met the standards set by 
the Convention.259  Phase 2 assesses the effectiveness of each country’s 
laws and anti-bribery enforcement efforts.260 Phase 3 is a permanent cycle 
of peer review that involves a more intensive evaluation of a country’s 
enforcement mechanisms than in Phase 2 and also analyzes the country’s 
efforts to address weaknesses identified during the Phase 2 review.261  One 
of the primary goals of Phase 3 review is to improve anti-bribery efforts 
in international business transactions by mutually evaluating parties through 
on-site visits and peer pressure.262 
The Working Group publishes quarterly country monitoring reports for 
each signatory263 and annual reports that explain how each signatory 
contributes to the global fight against corruption.264  These official reports 
provide an independent evaluation of a country’s enforcement status and 
offer data on how effective the convention is in prosecuting individuals 
and entities for foreign bribery.265  Monitoring reports not only allow 
reviewing parties to assess and criticize the country under examination, 
but also keeps those countries accountable for maintaining and enforcing 
foreign bribery provisions.  For example, the Working Group constantly 
 
 258.  See Recommendation of the Council for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign 
Public Officials in International Business Transactions, WORKING GRP. ON BRIBERY IN 
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criticized the U.K.’s inadequate anti-bribery laws, forcing it to enact the 
Bribery Act to bring its laws into compliance with the Convention in 2008.266 
B.  Benefits of Joining the OECD Convention 
While China is not yet a member of the OECD, it could gain a number 
of benefits by joining the OECD Convention.  Cooperation with other 
signatories and forced peer reviews may encourage other countries to aid 
China in fighting corruption in international business transactions.  
Although the OECD Convention does not have enforcement powers, peer-
pressure from other members could influence China to further clarify its 
foreign anti-corruption provisions, thus providing more transparency 
and guidance for international companies to follow.  Peer reviews, 
recommendations, follow-ups and critiques from the Working Group 
could present effective ideas for implementing new laws and additionally 
creates a mechanism that keeps China accountable for its anti-bribery 
provisions.  Furthermore, receiving recommendations from these reviews 
may provide new insight from a different perspective that may garner 
more support from the public than policies that are currently in place.  The 
review and follow-up mechanisms required by the OECD Convention 
also offset the absence of any similar processes in the UNCAC. 
Conversely, China could potentially learn a lot of valuable information 
by conducting peer reviews itself if it joined the OECD Convention.  
China’s own Working Group representatives can compare and observe 
another country’s practices as well as learn from its experiences in the 
quarterly peer review examinations.  Moreover, China can study what 
practices have and have not worked in other countries, thus saving time 
and experimentation costs in creating new national policies.  Lastly, both 
receiving and providing critiques between countries makes the peer review 
process fair and equal because every country undergoes the same type of 
scrutiny; thus, China will not feel that it is being singled out for any 
shortcomings in its foreign anti-corruption framework. 
Truly effective enforcement against corruption in multinational businesses 
requires active participation by both local and foreign governments.  Thus, 
China also needs clearly articulated domestic legislation to discourage 
international and domestic businesses from resorting to bribery as a means 
of conducting business and to prevent the formation of guanxi relationships 
with government officials.  By undergoing peer reviews and adopting 
recommendations by other OECD signatories, China may be able to 
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implement new policies that complement other foreign-reaching statutes 
such as the FCPA and UK Bribery Act, thus eliminating the vague laws 
currently in place and earning more international support for its policies. 
Furthermore, implementing new policies that complement other foreign 
statutes could facilitate cooperative foreign investigations and effectively 
combat corruption by international businesses.  The OECD Convention 
encourages its members “to the fullest extent possible under its laws and 
relevant treaties and arrangements, provide prompt and effective legal 
assistance to another Party.”267  Hence, being a party to the convention will 
improve government coordination between countries to continually ensure 
that China will receive aid in combatting the supply side of corruption.  
Finally, as a member of the G20 and a major economic player in world 
trade and investment, China has a responsibility to participate in the OECD 
Convention and help other signatories and fellow G20 members combat 
the spread of global corruption and promote a fairer global economy. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
President Xi once said that corrupt behavior, if unaddressed, “will 
evolve to be an invisible wall that separates the Party from the people, thus 
leaving the Party without root, lifeblood and power.”268  His anti-corruption 
campaign remains in full force, but without further systemic change, 
public distrust of the CPC will continue to be an issue.  Furthermore, while 
there are anti-bribery provisions in place, they lack any meaningful legal 
effect due to the ambiguous language and powerful CCDI.  In order to 
develop a truly successful anti-corruption regime, China must increase 
transparency, implement strict enforcement mechanisms, and maintain 
balance between objectives.  Rather than concentrating on deterring public 
officials from bribery, it must shift some of its focus to making widespread 
changes in order to achieve long-term success.  By establishing clear 
rules, an independent investigative agency, and an independent judiciary, 
the CPC may be able to prove that it is truly seeking institutional change 
rather than punishing political rivals and thereby regain the public’s trust. 
Some of these recommended changes would require a shift away from 
the principle of Party supremacy.  While the CPC has recently affirmed 
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its dominance over the legal system, these shifts demonstrate a necessary 
sacrifice in order for China to maintain a steady battle against corruption.  
Current measures have been successful in capturing several government 
officials and companies.  However, many of the campaigns in effect, such 
as the anti-extravagance campaign, seem more like symbolic moves that 
have only short-term deterrent results that boost the Party’s image.  
Developing an independent legal system will expose and investigate corruption 
cases without pressure from the CPC, ensure strong enforcement of anti-
corruption laws, and bring about permanent change. 
Due to longstanding historical, cultural, and political traditions, eradicating 
corruption in China will be a slow process.  Fully stamping out corruption 
involves eliminating the conditions that facilitated corruption in the first 
place, meaning that changes in traditions are necessary.  However, reforming 
legislation will yield numerous benefits for China.  Clarifying and expanding 
upon existing anti-corruption provisions will encourage compliance and 
help government officials understand what types of conduct are and are 
not permissible.  Maintaining a balance between regulating both the supply 
and demand side of bribery will also ensure that the burdens placed on 
individuals and businesses are not too great and that these burdens will 
not hinder economic activity.  Moreover, domestic companies will be able 
to develop satisfactory internal anti-bribery and accounting procedures, 
thus promoting self-regulation and providing a more efficient investigation 
process.  International businesses that are subject to the FCPA and Bribery 
Act and have invested in costly compliance programs will also benefit 
because China will provide a similar compliance environment. 
These various matters represent some of the issues that surround 
China’s developing anti-corruption movement.  The battle against bribery 
will call upon changes in China’s political, legal, and cultural framework, 
but adopting a more effective set of laws and implementing independent 
agencies will provide the domestic and international enforcement that China 
needs to finally eliminate corruption. 
 
